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ABSTRACT
While contractualism seems to solve some of the more pressing concerns of other moral theories, it does not conclusively address the
moral status of non-human animals. Peter Carruthers claims that contractualism excludes animals from having full moral status. I argue
that Carruthers’ arguments are fatally flawed due to his reliance on
contradictory claims, unlikely assumptions, and flagrant violations of
the contractualist method. However, Carruthers also claims that it is
possible to treat animals wrongly and that doing so deserves moral
criticism. This claim is based on indirect moral significance. However, this position makes it impossible for Carruthers to avoid endorsing
two extremely counter-intuitive claims. The work of C. Tucker and C.
MacDonald allows us to demonstrate that contractualism does give
animals full moral standing. They ground the criteria for a contracting agent in three characteristics that animals possess. A look at some
possible objections reveals nothing devastating to their proposal.
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Introduction
The contractualist theory of morality seems to solve some
of the more pressing concerns of other moral theories, such as
the counterintuitive results endorsed by utilitarian and deontological systems. However, it does not conclusively address
one of the current issues in applied ethics—the moral status of
non-human animals. In his book What We Owe to Each Other,
T. M. Scanlon claims that the moral status of non-human animals is outside the scope of contractualism, as the theory is
concerned only with what rational beings owe to one another.
Peter Carruthers, however, in The Animals Issue, claims that
the theory can definitively exclude animals from the category
of those with full moral status. I will first show that Carruthers’
arguments are fatally flawed, and therefore he cannot prove his
case. Then I will demonstrate, using the work of C. Tucker and
C. MacDonald, that contractualism does, in fact, allow for animals to be afforded full moral standing.
As with other contract systems of morality, Scanlonian contractualism is based on a type of agreement that contracting
agents make with one another. However, this should not be interpreted as a type of bargaining in which each participant endeavors to get as much as he can. The contractualist agents are
attempting to discover a set of principles that can be reasonably
justified by everyone involved. Scanlon provides the following
contractualist method of determining whether acts are right or
wrong, as he describes moral judgments in this manner:
[T]hey are judgments about what would be permitted
by principles that could not reasonably be rejected, by
people who were moved to find principles for the general regulation of behavior that others, similarly motivated, could not reasonably reject (Scanlon 1998, 4).
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We know that an act is wrong if a person seeking general
moral principles could reasonably reject a principle allowing
that act. Similarly, an act is permissible if no one could reasonably object to a principle that allows it. It is important to note
that, because this is a method of determining the content of morality, we cannot appeal to previously held moral beliefs when
engaging in the contracting process. Moral truth is what we are
seeking—not what we are presupposing. As Scanlon puts it, we
do not reject principles that allow murder because murder is
wrong. Murder is wrong because we reasonably reject principles that allow it. Moral prohibitions are found in the outcomes
of deliberations—not assumed at the outset.
Scanlon does not claim that contractualism is an account of
morality in its entirety. Rather, as previously stated, it is merely concerned with what we owe to other persons. As such, its
scope is not intended to cover certain categories of moral questions, such as those pertaining to animals or the environment.
However, we continue to attempt to ground moral rules regarding such issues on the contractualist system. Peter Carruthers,
in his book The Animals Issue, believes he can demonstrate that
a contractualist system has no place for animals among those
of moral standing. However, we can assign animals a type of
indirect moral significance. Let us evaluate his arguments.

Carruthers: Animals and Non-Rational Humans
The contractualist methodology is built upon the notion of
reasonable justification or rejection of moral principles. Peter
Carruthers asserts that animals’ lack of rationality excludes
them from direct participation in the moral framework, but he
is unwilling to say the same of infants, the severely mentally
impaired, those suffering from advanced Alzheimer’s and the
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like. He claims that mere membership in the human species is
sufficient for the possession of indirect moral standing.
Carruthers begins his argument with an appeal to the idea
that contractualists are essentially focused on maintaining a
peaceful and stable society. In order to achieve this, moral rules
must be what he calls psychologically supportable—in other
words, that rational agents should be psychologically equipped
to live as they prescribe. Moral rules must be compatible with
human nature, one aspect of which is strong attachment to infants and elderly family members. To ignore such a fundamental facet of our character is to risk societal upheaval.
According to Carruthers, people care deeply about our young
and old family members without regard to their status as rational agents. Therefore, “contracting agents should accord moral
standing to all human beings, and not just to those human beings who happen to be rational agents” (Carruthers 1992, 2.2).1
To do otherwise would be to reduce infants, etc. to the level of
personal property. This would provide them with some level
of protection, just as our property is protected through societal
and legal injunctions. However, there would certainly be no
guarantee that they could not, for example, be sacrificed for the
public good (as long as their “owners” were adequately compensated, of course). A society configured in this fashion would
be extremely volatile. Therefore, contracting agents must come
to the agreement that all human beings are worthy of being
granted moral status.
1. Citations are in reference to a later essay titled “The Animals Issue,” which
summarizes the book of the same name and can be found at:
http://www.philosophy.umd.edu/Faculty/pcarruthers/The%20Animals%20
Issue.pdf
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The objection that first comes to mind is that some people
care about their pets as much as other people care about their
grandmothers. If the government were to suddenly decide to
remove everyone’s pet dogs from their homes, there would be a
societal outcry that would likely be accompanied by violence.
The imagined consequences are clearly not that far-fetched—
there have been numerous violent acts committed in the name
of animal rights. It would surely be even worse if the animals
targeted were those with whom we have personal relationships.
So, if contractualists are concerned with preventing societal
chaos, why should dogs not have full moral standing under
their system?
Carruthers addresses this objection and claims that it fails because members of such groups as the Animal Liberation Front
are acting “not out of attachments that are a normal product of
human emotional mechanisms, but out of (what they take to be
justified) moral beliefs” (Carruthers 1992, 3.1). Carruthers is
correct in pointing out that the contractualist system allows for
no appeals to antecedent moral beliefs. We can only account for
moral principles after it has been demonstrated that no rational
agent could reasonably object to them.
While this response may succeed concerning laboratory
mice and the like, it does not seem to apply to household pets.
Our moral beliefs do not provide the impetus for the acquisition
of pets and the love we feel for them. Surely the contracting
agents would know that people are greatly devoted to their animal companions and, as such, realize that granting them moral
standing would enhance social stability. Carruthers rejects this
argument as well and offers two reasons. His first claim is that,
while being attached to our infants, etc. is a universally human trait, attachment to pets is not. Rather, such bonds may
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be attributed to cultural forces that are present in some places
but not others. As such, perhaps rational agents might decide
that society as a whole would be improved without such attachments.
His second claim is that we are rarely, if ever, as attached
to our pets as we are to our relatives. Thus, it should be easy
for people to accept the notion that pets are, in moral terms,
equivalent to private property. While we may love our pets,
we do not believe that they are our moral equals. We do not
keep a dog, for example, that threatens our child with a severe
allergic reaction, just as we do not keep a carpet that poses the
same threat. As the carpet is clearly secondary to concern for
the child, so is the dog.
There are two responses we may make to Carruthers. First,
a closer look at his two claims regarding our relationships with
our pets will show that they are contradictory in nature. His
first claim urges us to disregard our societal norms. While we
(in this society) have a great deal of affection for our pets, perhaps this is not ideal. It is possible that we might be better off
without them.
His second claim is based on the fact that we are generally
more attached to our (human) family members than we are to
animals, even if they are our own pets. However, this evidence
arises from our societal norms—to which we are prevented
from appealing in his first claim! Are we to conclude from this
that we are to adhere to our social norms or to discard them?
There is no reason to believe that rational agents, especially those concerned about social stability, would contract for a
society without attachments to animal companions. There is
overwhelming evidence that proximity to animals greatly en-
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hances the quality of our lives—in both the mental and physical
realms. Regarding Carruthers’ first claim, it is more reasonable
to believe that such agents would approve of our attachments
to our pets than otherwise. And as for his second claim, while
granting that we probably should not keep the allergy-inducing
dog, societal harmony would certainly not be served by tossing
him into the dumpster with the carpet.
Carruthers next discusses Scanlon’s proposal that animals
could be assigned representation for their interests. While, as
previously stated, Scanlon is not committed to addressing the
standing of animals within contractualism, he is not opposed to
the possibility that they are entitled to trustees who represent
their interests in the contracting process. Such trustees would
be charged with assessing moral principles from the point of
view of animals. Thus, actions permitted by principles that
would face reasonable objections from these representatives
would be considered morally wrong.
Needless to say, Carruthers disapproves of Scanlon’s proposal. He claims that allowing for animal representation is completely incompatible with the essence of contractualism. He
questions why we would find it necessary to assign representatives to animals “unless it were believed that animals deserve to
have their interests protected?” (Carruthers 1992, 3.2). But to
believe this is to appeal to a preexisting moral principle—that
animals are deserving of this type of consideration—before the
contracting process has even begun. This is a violation of the
contractualist system.
While this is perhaps the most compelling argument Carruthers has yet offered, not only does it fail, but it is incompatible with his own views. As we have seen, he believes that
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infants, etc. have full, yet indirect, moral standing. This is not,
as he puts it, some sort of “second class moral citizenship”
(Carruthers 1992, 2.4). Because it does not arise from such individuals’ participation in the contract procedure, however, it
is an indirect standing. Recall that Carruthers is willing to attribute moral standing to infants, etc. because of the negative
social ramifications of doing otherwise. But this standing does
not consist of making principles regarding infants, etc. that are
in the interest of rational beings. Such principles are in the interest of the non-rational beings themselves. How is this determined? Certainly a newborn baby is not qualified to act for
himself in a contract procedure. His interests must be protected
by a rational representative—someone who will advocate for
what the child would reasonably accept or reject.
As we have seen, if we are concerned about societal stability,
we cannot exclude either infants, etc. or animals from moral
consideration. Thus, if infants and the like are to be represented
by trustees, animals should be afforded the same courtesy. They
need not “deserve” (in a moral sense) to be included in order to
merit inclusion. It is merely the recognition that, if they are to
be included for the same reason that infants, etc. are included,
they must also be provided representation in a trustee system.
Thus, if we are to accept the inclusion of infants, etc. in the
company of those granted moral standing because we do not
wish to risk social instability, then there is no justification for
excluding animals. Carruthers has so far failed to convince us
that infants and animals should be categorized differently under
the contractualist system. Since the idea that infants and other
humans lacking rationality have no moral standing is extremely
counterintuitive, it is more reasonable to attribute moral standing to animals instead.
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Carruthers: An Argument for Indirect
Moral Significance
Based on what we have seen, it is surprising that Carruthers
goes on to assert that it is possible to, in fact, treat animals
wrongly, and that those who do so are deserving of moral criticism. If animals have no moral standing, how can this be? Carruthers wants to accommodate our intuitions that treating animals badly is to act in a morally reprehensible way—that to set
a cat on fire, for example, is to behave wrongly. In order to do
so, he appeals to the notion of indirect moral significance.
Essentially, his claim is that such acts are wrong because of
what they demonstrate about the character of those who commit them. If we see a person set a cat on fire, he has exposed the
cruelty of his character, and it is by this that we judge his act as
wrong. Carruthers tells us that “we sometimes judge actions by
the qualities of moral character that they evince, irrespective of
any morally significant harm that they cause, or of any rights
that they infringe” (Carruthers 1992, 4.2). To illustrate this, he
provides the following example:
Suppose that Lazy Jane is a doctor who is attending a
conference of other medical professionals at a large hotel. She is relaxing in the bar during the evening, sitting
alone with her drink in a cubicle. The bar is so arranged
that there are many separate cubicles surrounding it,
from each of which the bar itself is plainly visible, but
the insides of which are invisible to each other. Jane
is idly watching someone walk alone towards the bar
when he collapses to the floor with all the signs of having undergone a serious heart-attack. Jane feels no impulse to assist him, and continues calmly sipping her
martini (Carruthers 1992, 4.2).
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Why do we want to say (as I assume we do) that Jane’s actions are wrong? As Carruthers points out, no harm comes to
the heart-attack victim. As there are dozens of medical personnel around, someone quickly attends to him, just as Jane knew
would be the case. Furthermore, the man had no claim on Jane,
thus his rights were not violated. Perhaps he would have been
correct if he had said, “Someone ought to help me.” But what
if he had said, “Jane in particular should help me?” It is hard to
say that he would have been correct in this. However, we still
believe that Jane, in her inaction, has acted wrongly. Carruthers
explains our intuition thusly: “[I]t is wrong because of what it
reveals about her. Specifically, it shows her to be callous and
indifferent to the suffering of other people” (Carruthers 1992,
4.2).
This example lays the foundation for his beliefs about our
indirect duties towards animals:
They derive from the good or bad qualities of moral
character that the actions in question would display and
encourage; where those qualities are good or bad in
virtue of the role that they play in the agent’s interactions with other human beings (Carruthers 1992, 4.2).
In other words, setting a cat on fire is evidence of a cruel character. However, he asserts that a cruel character is bad because
it will doubtless express itself through cruelty directed toward
other human beings. This will explicitly violate the rights of
those individuals who are harmed. Carruthers claims that this
explanation accounts for our intuitions that to set cats alight
is to behave wrongly, while at the same time it allows him to
maintain the stance that animals do not have moral status.
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Is this position defensible? It seems that Carruthers makes
an excellent point when he notes that contracting rational
agents are not “calculating machines;” rather, we have “limited
time, limited memory, and limited intellectual powers” (Carruthers 1992, 5.1). We cannot always take the time to reason
slowly and thoroughly when a decision must be made. Thus, it
would be in the best interests of contracting agents to agree on
a principle advocating the cultivation of certain character traits.
This leads to the further agreement that people’s actions can be
judged according to the qualities of character that they demonstrate—regardless of other factors. We would be hard pressed
to object to what he has said here.
However, it is not clear that this explains why it is wrong to
set fire to a cat. It seems that Carruthers would find it difficult to
explain why it is more wrong to perform the action than to simply have the desire to perform the action. If acts are only wrong
because they are representations of character, then the act in
and of itself has no moral weight attached to it. Intuitively, this
is suspect, for we do want to say that it is more wrong to actually set a cat on fire than to merely have the character of a catburner. Acts and desires are not judged by the same standard.
But if the action is only morally wrong because it signifies a
bad character, then we must discard our intuition. This seems
problematic.
Furthermore, Carruthers’ position also forces him to endorse
a second counter-intuitive claim. If setting a cat alight is only
wrong because it is an expression of a cruel character, and
cruelty is wrong because it will be directed at humans, then it
would not be wrong to set a cat on fire if there were no other
human beings on Earth. As long as other humans could not be
affected by a particular individual, that person would have free
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rein to treat animals in any manner he chose—regardless of the
pain and suffering this would inflict upon them. Again, this is
not a claim that most of us would countenance.
Therefore, it seems that Carruthers has failed to adequately
defend any of his arguments. His attempt to separate the standing of infants, etc. and the standing of animals with an appeal
to societal stability cannot withstand scrutiny. If maintaining
order is a central concern, it is clear that animals should be
granted moral standing. In addition, in attempting to explain
away our feeling that it is wrong to treat animals poorly, he
violates some of our deepest intuitions. While it is certainly not
the case that intuition is the guiding force behind morality, such
a glaring transgression compels us to investigate whether, in
fact, contractualism might have something better to say about
the moral standing of non-human animals.

Tucker & MacDonald: The Nature of Contracting
Agents
So far, we have described contractualism as a moral system
based on principles agreed to by rational agents. It is precisely
this characterization that threatens to exclude animals from the
scope of morality. But perhaps we are describing contractors
too rigidly. Is rationality really a requirement to take part in the
contractualist system?
C. Tucker and C. MacDonald, in their article “Beastly Contractarianism? A Contractarian Analysis of the Possibility of
Animal Rights,” claim that rationality is not necessary for an
individual to be a contracting agent. What is important is not
the precise mental mechanism that is used. This is not something with which agents should be concerned. Rather, what
matters is that the behavior of the agent “can be reliably pre-
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dicted or, if need be, modified” (Tucker and MacDonald 2004,
9). The problem, as they see it, is that we have been interpreting
the “contract” too literally. To realize that it is just a metaphor
will enable us to lessen the demands upon those who would
take part in the system. As they put it:
That there is a contract... only requires (roughly) that
each party to the contract modify its behaviour in a way
that enhances the utility of at least some other parties to
the contract, and that each party to the contract benefit
by being a party (Tucker and MacDonald 2004, 9).
This allows contractualists to include beings in our moral system that common sense says should be included, such as infants, the mentally deficient, and animals. They propose three
characteristics that are collectively sufficient for engaging in
a contractualist agreement: potency, vulnerability, and responsiveness. We will look at each characteristic and see how it relates to animals.
Potency is the ability of an individual to behave in a range of
ways that affect the utility of other agents. Without this ability,
others stand to gain or lose nothing by refusing to contract with
them. Such individuals would merely be treated with indifference, and as such would not be able to be party to a contract.
Animals are certainly potent in this sense. Our household pets
can make us angry by disobedience and bad behavior, and such
behavior can even affect our relationships with friends and
neighbors. On the other hand, they also provide us with affection and loyalty. As we noted previously, pets enhance our lives
in a number of ways—even including our health. Animals in
the wild meet the potency criterion as well. Most of them are
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predators and, as such, have the appropriate physical apparatus—fangs, claws, poison, etc.
The second characteristic, vulnerability, is the other side of
potency. Contracting agents must be susceptible to being affected by the actions of others. Without being vulnerable, the
agent would have little or no reason to contract with others, or
to change its own behavior. It would simply be indifferent to
other agents. Pets are clearly vulnerable to the whims of their
owners, but all animals are vulnerable to humans to some extent. Many wild animals are killed by humans or threatened by
the destruction of their natural habitat by human encroachment.
The last characteristic is responsiveness. This is the ability
of individuals to respond to others and to change their behavior
in return. Without this quality, a potential agent would not be
able to modify its own behavior when it sees that other agents
have done so. It should be clear that animals possess this last
criterion as well. Both domesticated and wild animals are capable of altering their behavior when rewards and punishments
result from doing so. Any being that can be conditioned would
meet this criterion.
These three characteristics are sufficient for contracting
agents, Tucker and MacDonald claim, because the aim of the
contract is to create the best possible relationship between the
parties. The fact that an entity is both potent and vulnerable “is
what makes it rational to ‘ask’ another to constrain its behavior” (Tucker and MacDonald 2004, 10). “Asking”, however, is
not to be interpreted in the human language sense. It might be
something as simple as making it apparent that we are willing
to do the same. In this sense, “asking” and “offering” do not
necessarily require rational capacities. As long as an individual
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is able to modify its behavior in a mutually beneficial manner,
this is enough to meet the criteria for inclusion in a contractualist system.

Objections and Responses
Tucker and MacDonald assert that they have provided a successful defense of the claim that animals can be part of a contractualist moral framework. However, it may be observed that
their proposal does not address the fact that their three central
characteristics come in varying degrees. Does this mean that
moral standing varies as well? Or is there a minimum standard—and if so, what is it? Does a fish, for example, have full
moral standing, minimal moral standing, or none at all?
One point that I believe can be easily addressed is that moral
standing in a contractualist system is not the sort of thing that
admits of degrees. An individual either possesses it, or he does
not. The creation of a kind of moral hierarchy is in total opposition to our current project. While this could be taken to imply that contractualism is simply not equipped to deal with the
moral status of non-human animals, to accept this view is to fall
prey to the common intuition that different kinds of beings have
different degrees of worth. It is true that this belief has been
defended by Mary Anne Warren among others. However, I do
not believe this position is strong enough to result in a rejection
of contractualism as a foundation for animal ethics.
Some individuals do not count more than others in a contract
system—it is inherently equalizing. Even proposals to afford
animals and/or infants, etc., “indirect” or “secondary” moral
standing do not intend for those phrases to indicate a kind of
attenuated value. The use of those terms is meant to refer solely
to the way that such individuals come to be participants in the
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moral system—not the level of their moral worth. The contractualist is committed to the idea that every contracting agent has
the same degree of moral standing.
The more difficult notion is that of delineating between
animals who have the relevant characteristics and those who
do not. The animals that are generally subjects of concern in
moral theorizing—dogs, cows, bears and the like—can be seen
to meet the criteria. It is the “lower” animals that are cause for
concern. Sometimes we simply do not know enough about a
certain animal to determine its characteristics with certainty.
Just as utilitarians are still trying to ascertain whether fish can
feel pain, the contractualist is charged with determining whether fish have the qualities of a contracting agent. Intuitively, it
seems that all sentient creatures will fulfill the requirements. It
is difficult to conceive of such animals lacking the ability to act
upon and be acted upon by others in the relevant ways, as well
as the ability to modify their behavior when necessary.
However, it is certainly not impossible that such a being
could exist, and there is a two-part response to this consideration. First, it is better to err on the side of caution and grant
moral status to undeserving beings than to exclude from such
status those who belong. Second, if faced with such a creature,
it would be very easy to fall into utilitarianism and take its ability to suffer as justification for inclusion in the moral realm. But
as contractualists, this is not an acceptable solution. Perhaps we
will simply have to bite the bullet and deny moral status in such
a case. A more optimistic viewpoint is that, in a contractualist
society such as the one we have been discussing, people will
be sufficiently accustomed to treating all animals with moral
concern that such a creature would be well treated as a mat-
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ter of course. That seems like a society to which no one could
reasonably object.
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